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ITEM: 31

DATE: 7/12/62

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

RUSK MEMO TO JFK

PAGES: 4

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: BRITISH GUIANA, GENERAL, 6/62-12/62

BOX #: 15

SANITIZED: NLK-03-145, 1/04

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July 12, 1962

Bis Business
Brady 7/12

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FILE

Subject: British Guiana

We have reassessed the probable orientation of an independent British Guiana under Cheddi Jagan's leadership and I attach for your consideration a paper describing the program we propose to follow (Enclosure 1).

A Special National Intelligence Estimate dated April 11, 1962, concluded "We believe . . . that Jagan is a Communist, though the degree of Moscow's control is not yet clear. A Jagan government in the post independence period would probably follow a policy of nonalignment in international affairs, but would probably lean in the Soviet direction."

We have also been given by the FBI a report of the American Communist Party's intention to seek for Jagan economic assistance from the Soviet bloc (Enclosure 3). Attached is a study we have prepared of contacts by the People's Progressive Party (PPP) with communists, communist fronts and the communist bloc since September, 1961 (Enclosure 4). During cross examination before the Commonwealth Commission of Enquiry into the causes of the February riots Jagan admitted on June 22, 1962 that he was a communist. This admission came after much muddled explanation by Jagan as to what the term "communism" meant and was qualified by his definition that communism was a system based on "from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs". Further questioning on Jagan's political beliefs was cut short on June 26 by the British Chairman of the Commission with the ruling that it was useless to pursue the subject since it had "already been established beyond peradventure" that

Dr. Jagan

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FRU'S, V. III, # 2806
NLK-63-145
By <u>MAD</u> NARA, Date <u>1/04</u>

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Dr. Jagan was a communist.

In the light of all the evidence which has now accumulated, I believe we are obliged to base our policy on the premise that, once independent, Cheddi Jagan will establish a "Marxist" regime in British Guiana and associate his country with the Soviet Bloc to a degree unacceptable to us for a state in the Western Hemisphere. Such a development would have severe adverse effects in the foreign relations field and obvious undesirable repercussions within this country.

It is also my view that a policy of trying to work with Jagan, as urged by the British, will not pay off. Jagan is already too far committed emotionally and suspicious of our intentions.

My conclusion, therefore, is that we should set as our objective the replacement of the Jagan government prior to the independence of British Guiana which it now seems will take place in 1963.

I propose that we transfer the locale of the discussions with the U.S. on British Guiana to Washington and that I call in the British Ambassador and speak to him along the lines indicated in the attached paper. My thought in transferring the locale to Washington is to enable us to deal through a sympathetic British Ambassador with the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister rather than sending messages to our Embassy in London which in practice usually discusses British Guiana with the not so sympathetic Colonial Office. It is further helpful to us to talk in Washington because we have available here people with the most up-to-date U.S. information on British Guiana and we would be able to provide nuances of our current thinking to the British Ambassador.

Recommendations

I recommend that you approve specifically the following:

1. That it is an objective of U.S. policy to bring about the replacement of the government of Cheddi Jagan by one friendly to the West, prepared to follow multi-racial policies and to carry out a

realistic

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realistic economic and social development program.

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

5. That you approve my talking with the British Ambassador along the lines of Section I of the attached paper and that we try to maintain Washington as the venue for any further discussions on British Guiana in the immediate future. This would constitute a reply to Prime Minister Macmillan's letter to you of May 30 (Enclosure 6).

Dean Rusk

Concurrences

Enclosures

1. Action Program for British Guiana.

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

4. State Department report on "PPP Relations with Communists, Communist Fronts, and Communist Bloc".

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5. [REDACTED]
6. Letter from Macmillan to the President of May 30.

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Version B

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: British Guiana

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[REDACTED]

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Dr. Jagan

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)(d)

mk00-26, #16, st. ed. 6/11/02, CIA-ELN 6/5/03

By dal NARA, Date 7/15/03

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095 to DOD-6: [unclear]
097 to CIA Mr. [unclear]
JUL 12 1962 Not a copy
to T.A. Purcell

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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[Redacted]

We have also been given by the FBI a report of the American Communist Party's intention to seek for Jagan economic assistance from the Soviet bloc (Enclosure 2). Attached is a study we have prepared of contacts by the People's Progressive Party (PPP) with communists, communist fronts and the communist bloc since September, 1961 (Enclosure 3). During cross examination before the Commonwealth Commission of Inquiry into the causes of the February riots Jagan admitted on June 22, 1962 that he was a communist. This admission came after much muddled explanation by Jagan as to what the term "communist" meant and was qualified by his definition that communism was a system based on "man each according to his ability and to each according to his needs". Further questioning on Jagan's political beliefs was cut short on June 23 by the British Chairman of the Commission with the ruling that it was useless to pursue the subject since it had "already been established beyond peradventure" that

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Dr. Jagan was a communist.

In the light of all the evidence which has now accumulated, I believe we are obliged to base our policy on the premise that, once independent, Guiana will establish a "Communist" regime in British Guiana and associate his country with the Soviet bloc to a degree unacceptable to us for a state in the Western Hemisphere. Such a development would have severe adverse effects in the foreign relations field and obvious undesirable repercussions within this country.

It is also my view that a policy of trying to work with Jagan, as urged by the British, will not pay off. Jagan is already too far committed emotionally and suspicious of our intentions.

I propose that we transfer the locale of the discussions with the U.S. on British Guiana to Washington and that I call in the British Ambassador and speak to him along the lines indicated in the attached paper. My thought in transferring the locale to Washington is to enable us to deal through a sympathetic British Ambassador with the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister rather than sending messages to our Embassy in London which in practice usually discusses British Guiana with the not so sympathetic Colonial Office. It is further helpful to us to talk in Washington because we have available here people with the most up-to-date U.S. information on British Guiana and we would be able to provide substance of our current thinking to the British Ambassador.

Recommendations

I recommend that you approve specifically the following:

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realistic economic and social development program.

2. That we inform the British of our intentions [redacted]

3. That we commence, immediately [redacted] in British Guiana and initiate [redacted] discussions of political action with Burnham, Sai and D'Aguiar (Enclosure 5).

4. That in the light of the discussions referred to in No. 3 and other developments affecting British Guiana we work out the details of a political action program and seek your further approval before implementation.

5. That you approve my talking with the British Ambassador along the lines of Section I of the attached paper and that we try to maintain Washington as the venue for any further discussions on British Guiana in the immediate future. This would constitute a reply to Prime Minister Macmillan's letter to you of May 30 (Enclosure 6).

Dean Rusk

Concurrence

Enclosures:

1. Action Program for British Guiana. ✓

2. FBI report. ✓

4. State Department report on "US Relations with Communists, Communist Fronts, and Communist Bloc". ✓

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5. ☐ Program of Political Action. C 1176
6. Letter from Macmillan to the President of May 30.

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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUIANA

I. The United Kingdom

A. Discussion

Last September we agreed with the British on a policy of trying to work with Jagan. On February 19, 1962, the Secretary wrote to Lord Home that he had reached the conclusion we could not put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan and urged him to agree that new elections should be scheduled and that Jagan should not accede to power again. The British reacted strongly and negatively. On March 8 the President directed that no final decision on our policy toward British Guiana should be taken until further consultations were held with the British. The Secretary spoke with Lord Home in March in Geneva and, during Prime Minister Macmillan's April visit, State Department representatives reiterated to members of Macmillan's staff our hope that alternatives to Jagan's leadership would emerge prior to independence. They also expressed the desire to keep in close touch with the British



The dominant British preoccupation is to dispossess themselves of responsibility for British Guiana as quickly and decently as possible. They see no easy practical alternative to Jagan and are seeking to stabilize the situation under his leadership. They are intent on avoiding being faced with a need to suspend the constitution and resume direct rule as they did in 1953. You will recall that at the time of the February riots British troops were sent to Georgetown at Jagan's request to restore law and order. On June 8 the British advanced to Jagan \$1,820,000 to meet a desperate financial situation. In neither case were we consulted. Both of these decisions had the effect of bolstering Jagan's government.

Our objective of replacing Jagan will, therefore, probably be resisted by the British. They will mistrust the efficacy of a U.S. political action program in the Colony and fear that the result could require reinstitution of direct British rule.

We must face up to this difference with the British. While further consultations are unlikely to result in agreement, we hope to secure British acquiescence. By delaying a

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decision we will just lose opportunities to accomplish our objective and arrive that much closer to British Guiana's independence without our having done anything about Jagan. Under the circumstances we should inform the British of our conclusions and of the program we are undertaking at the same time soliciting their cooperation.

Accordingly, we propose that the Secretary speak to the British Ambassador on the following lines.

B. Talking Points with the British Ambassador

1. The President appreciated Prime Minister Macmillan's letter of May 30. He has asked me to convey our thoughts in reply through you to Lord Home and to the Prime Minister.

2. We welcome the Prime Minister's suggestion for special consultations about British Guiana. We would prefer to hold them in Washington, however, since we have no British Guiana expert on our staff in London. (The Colonial Attaché at the British Embassy is an expert on the subject.)

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5. It is quite clear that Jagan is distrustful of U.S. motives and there is little chance of our obtaining his confidence. It seems unrealistic, therefore, to hope now that British Guiana can be kept on the side of the West by a policy of cooperation. Our hopes for this in September, 1961, have been destroyed by subsequent events.

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6. We cannot afford to see another communist regime established in this Hemisphere. You can appreciate that the reaction both within the U.S. and throughout Latin America would be severely adverse.

7. We feel compelled, therefore, to set as our objective, an independent British Guiana under some other leader than Jagan.

8. We are glad that you envisage new elections. This would provide an opportunity for a government of a different complexion to come into power through democratic process. However, the coalescing of the various elements now opposed to Jagan into a winning combination will be no easy task. Postponement of the independence conference is also welcome news since it will afford more time.

9. The President has personally studied the problem and has come to the conclusion that there is no alternative to developing a program to bring about a suitable coalition and to assure that Jagan does not win a new election.

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11. In the economic field we are going ahead with the additional detailed studies our survey mission recently returned from British Guiana recommended. We hope thereby to let the people of British Guiana know we are serious about helping them and to be that much further along with the preliminary work by the time a new government comes into power.

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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUIANA

II. Action in British Guiana

A. Discussion

The task is to determine the best manner to bring into power a government friendly to the West and ready to pursue a multi-racial policy and a realistic social and economic program.

We believe we should take advantage of the row elections which the British envisage prior to independence. After independence Jagan will be freer to consolidate his hold over the country, to organize a PPF-controlled militia and to obtain overt support from the Communist Bloc including Cuba. Row elections could come about either through the fall of the Jagan government by the defection of Balram Singh Rai, Minister of Home Affairs, and two or three other PPF members or by agreement among the parties and the British on elections as a step towards independence.

A constituency-by-constituency analysis of the 35 seats in the Legislative Assembly indicates that, in another election, the Jagan's Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) can count on 16 safe seats; Burnham's Peoples National Congress (PNC), 11 seats; and D'Aguiar's United Front (UF), 2 seats. This leaves 6 seats in the doubtful category and it is on these constituencies that our efforts would be focussed.

The combined strength of the opposition elements clearly is required to defeat Jagan. Assuming we are able to bring about this cooperation, the following results in the 6 marginal constituencies may be hoped for:

Kahlaia (1961 results - PPP - 51.1%) -
victory by Rai supported by the UF and PNC.

Paneroon (1961 result - PPP - 42.5%) -
victory by PNC supported by the UF and Rai.

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Houston (1961 result - PPP - 50.1%) -
victory by PNC supported by the UF and Rai.

Demarara Coast Central - (1961 result -
PPP - 50.6%) - victory by PNC supported by
UF and Rai.


Georgetown North - (1961 result - UF - 50.01%) -
victory by UF supported by PNC.

Georgetown Central - (1961 result - UF - 55%) -
victory by UF supported by PNC.

(The UF and the PNC are the only real contenders
for these two Georgetown seats).

On this basis a PNC-UF grouping would have 19 seats in the
Legislative Assembly to 16 for the PPP.

As can be seen from this political arithmetic a favorable
result is by no means assured



B. Strategy

Our present thinking on strategy involves the following:

1. Tacit election arrangements between Burnham and D'Aguiar
to avoid election conflicts rather than formation of a PNC-UF coal-
ition. In the August 1961 elections the PNC and UF spent a good deal
of time fighting each other. If an understanding is reached energies
could be concentrated on the doubtful constituencies. Because of
dislike by the Congress for the Portuguese a coalition probably would
cost the PNC votes and the UF leaders are unlikely to place themselves
at Burnham's mercy by disbanding their party.


2. An independent campaign by Rai who has now been expelled
from the PPP. We believe that he could carry with him an appreciable

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
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number of moderate Indian voters, particularly Indian businessmen, and that his influence is needed to swing the balance against the PPP in three key constituencies having a high proportion of Indian voters. Probably Lai should run independently rather than on a coalition ticket with the PNC to avoid charges that he is a traitor to the Indian race. The Indians constitute about 40% of the population and are the most rapidly growing group. Thus, it is essential to provide them an opportunity to participate in governing the country.


3. An undertaking by Burnham that while he would head the new government, important and specific positions in it, e.g., a Deputy Prime Ministership for Lai, would be given to the Indian and business groups. Running on a Negro platform, Burnham could not hope to win. During the campaign he would have to emphasize multiracialism, efficiency in government and a realistic social and economic development program.

C. Implementation



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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUIANA

III. Economic Program

A. Discussion

The desire for economic advancement is a major feature in British Guiana's political life. Jagan's policies and the incompetence of his government are destroying public confidence in his ability to meet this desire. Jagan is shopping for economic aid from both East and West. He has had little success to date except from the U.K. which recently advanced him approximately \$1.8 million to keep him from bankruptcy. Because of the political importance of economic assistance we should maintain maximum flexibility in the economic field.

Moving ahead with preparations for a development program - has the approval of all three political parties in British Guiana, and is strongly urged by the British Government. The preliminary report of the Hoffman Mission recommends that the development of the interior should have a high priority in any overall plan. This would draw the population from the over-crowded coastal strip which depends on sugar cultivation. The preliminary surveys we are now undertaking, and the development program itself, would thus bring important economic benefits to the country. It would also have valuable political impact. Such a development program would be expensive and could not be entirely financed by the United States, except over a considerable period of time. However, certain aspects, notably hydro-electric development, should prove bankable.

B. AID Action

1. For the immediate future, our aid level should be maintained at about the current level to support a continuing Technical Assistance program.
2. We should keep up the momentum generated by the Hoffman Mission in order to convince the people of British Guiana that we are sincerely interested eventually in assisting them.
3. We should proceed with the surveys intended to establish the validity of the development program, tentatively envisaged by the

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Hoffman Mission. They involve:

- a) an engineering and feasibility study of the Atkinson-McKenzie Road;
- b) actual cutting of the Barbice Bar to establish whether a permanent cut would be feasible;
- c) a hydro-electric study in the Barbice area;
- d) a soil study in the Barbice area.

4. Depending on political developments we should be prepared to move quickly into an adequate economic support program of at least \$5 - 10 million annually designed to promote U.S. policy objectives. By completing the surveys now, we should be able to move forward rapidly at the appropriate time.

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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUIANA

IV. The Congress

A. Discussion

The Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees appear reluctant to discuss British Guiana. They sense difficulties comparable to those experienced in Cuba. They seem to wish to avoid being implicated in a possible failure to stop communism in British Guiana. There is particular concern about "aid to Japan" which may get involved with the current debate on aid to Poland and Yugoslavia. It is important that as many Congressmen as possible are informed about our approach to the British Guiana situation and that they support our policy. For reasons of security only certain Congressmen can be informed of the general nature of our entire program. We should persist in our efforts to brief the Congress along the following lines.

B. Action by State and AID

Brief selected Congressmen taking the following approach:

- 1) Our objective is an independent British Guiana under a non-Communist government prepared to take its place in the inter-American system.
- 2) Such a new government should have a multi-racial complexion. It should have a realistic economic and social development program. It should favor private investment.
- 3) There is political ferment in the Colony and increasing dissatisfaction with Jagan. This dissatisfaction stems from his incompetence and to a lesser extent from his ideology. The bulk of the population is pro-American. There are persistent reports of communist connections on the part of the leaders of the P.P.R.
- 4) New elections are likely prior to independence. While opposition groups are strong they are divided among themselves. The results of the election are hard to predict. (A full briefing of the racial and political alignments would be given together with an analysis of the previous election results.)

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5) The British bear primary responsibility for the colony. They are anxious to decolonize quickly but they wish to do so decently. They are under pressure in the UN to abandon colonialism. Latin American opinion is hostile to European colonialism in the Western Hemisphere. Latin American opinion would in general share our objective in British Guiana. The British have already postponed the independence conference originally projected for May.

6) We plan to continue for the moment our modest technical assistance program. This keeps our foot in the door and our technicians in contact with grass roots public opinion which is pro-American. We will conduct various surveys in connection with the evaluation of a possible development program. Should the political situation become favorable, we would then consider extending modest economic assistance.

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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUIANA

V. Public Opinion and Propaganda

A. Discussion

There is a steady flow of mail and expressions of press interest in the British Guiana situation. This is stimulated partly by Americans of Guianese descent and partly by the activities of opposition groups in the Colony seeking financial support in the U.S. Jagan's appointment with the President, his speech at the National Press Club, and his appearance on television in October 1961 developed public interest. The riots and the burning of Georgetown in February has kept this interest alive. Among right-wing groups in the U.S., the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade has been the most active. Both Dr. Schwartz and his colleague Dr. Sluis have been garrotted as prohibited immigrants into the Colony due to the Crusade's activities there. Public comment generally views developments in the Colony with alarm and urges that action (unspecified) be taken. All oppose the giving of "aid to Jagan".

B. U.S. Public Line

1. Avoid comment in the immediate future as far as possible. If forced to give opinions we should view the situation with concern and indicate our sympathy for the people of British Guiana. We would point out that primary responsibility rests with the U.K. which has postponed the date of the independence conference originally scheduled for May.

2. Later, when developments warrant, we should step up U.S. public statements emphasizing: (a) the mismanagement of the Jagan government; (b) the communist ideologies of certain PIP leaders and their significance.

C. Propaganda

1. We should stimulate now in Latin America, especially the Caribbean, and if possible in the U.K., public statements on the line of two above.

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ACTION PROGRAM FOR BRITISH GUIANA

VI. Contingency Plans

A. Discussion

Should the program described above fail completely there are other actions which could be taken to hamper or prevent a communist takeover in British Guiana. Each has severe drawbacks and is less desirable than the action proposed. The Venezuelan and Brazilian claims are considered to be weak and neither country desires to take over the narrow coastal strip on which British Guiana's population and its problems are located. The deliberate provocation of racial strife or character assassination is repugnant to most Americans. Race riots in British Guiana could have serious repercussions in Surinam and Trinidad which also have mixed African and Indian populations.

B. Diplomatic

1. Encourage Venezuela and possibly Brazil to pursue their territorial claims. This could result in an indefinite delay in independence.

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